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Review of Regulatory Emphasis on Transportation Safety in 
the United States, 2002-2009: Public versus Private Modes 
Garrett C. Waycaster1, Taiki Matsumura2, Volodymyr Bilotkach3, Raphael T. 
Haftka4, Nam H. Kim5 
The US Department of Transportation is responsible for implementing new safety 
improvements and regulations with the goal of ensuring limited funds are distributed to where 
they can have the greatest impact on safety. In this work, we conduct a study of new 
regulations and other reactions (such as recalls) to fatal accidents in several different modes of 
transportation implemented from 2002-2009. We find that in the safest modes of commercial 
aviation and bus transport, the amount of spending on new regulations is high in relation to the 
number of fatalities compared to the regulatory attention received by less safe modes of 
general aviation and private automobiles. Additionally, we study two major fatal accident 
investigations from commercial aviation and two major automotive recalls associated with 
fatal accidents. We find differences in the cost per expected fatality prevented for these 
reactions, with the airline accident investigations being more cost effective. Overall, we 
observe trends in both the automotive and aviation sectors which suggest that public 
transportation receives more regulatory attention than private transport. We also observe that 
the types of safety remedies utilized, regulation versus investigation, have varying levels of 
effectiveness in different transport modes. We suggest that these differences are indicative of 
increased public demand for safety in modes where a third party may be held responsible, even 
for those not participating in the transportation. These findings have important implications for 
the transportation industry, policy makers, and for estimating the public demand for safety in 
new transport modes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Travel related fatalities continue to be a leading cause of accidental death in the United States(1), despite 
significant improvements in recent decades(2). In attempting to improve safety performance, one important constraint 
of new safety measures is cost, for which the US Department of Transportation uses the guideline of the value of 
statistical life, most recently set at $9.1 million(3). Such constraints avoid undue financial burden on individual 
travelers and commercial transportation while ensuring that funds are not over-allocated to a single issue but spread 
across multiple risk sources. 
 In this paper, we conduct a survey of the cost of US federal government regulations for safety enhancement in 
various modes of transportation, including commercial air carriers, commuter and air taxi, general aviation, private 
automobiles, and buses. This survey is intended to reveal how resources have been allocated for different modes of 
transportation. We will seek to uncover whether public demand for safety varies across different modes of 
transportation and if so, to determine why this might happen. We also investigate four major transportation safety 
cases from the past decade, two from commercial aviation and two from automobiles, to attempt to determine if 
their remedies are cost effective.  In each of these cases, we consider a system design flaw related to a 
miscalculation, manufacturing or maintenance error, or unexpected operating condition which led to a risk of fatal 
accidents.  We determine the break-even point of the investment by calculating the probability of a fatality prior to 
the safety improvement necessary to justify the cost of the improvement. Through this demonstration, we discuss the 
cost effectiveness of the current safety improvement cycle in the civil transportation sector. 
 Several significant prior works have examined the way the cost effectiveness of safety improvements has been 
analyzed. Viscusi and Aldy(4) provide a detailed overview of various factors affecting the applied value of statistical 
life. Morrall(5) and Tengs et al.(6) both provide reviews of the cost effectiveness of previously implemented or 
proposed life-saving measures across many different fields. Cropper and Portney(7) outline some of the difficulties 
faced by regulators and policy makers in attempting to quantify cost effectiveness for new safety measures. Hammitt 
and Graham(8) outline the difficulty in assessing survey respondents’ willingness to pay for safety, particularly in the 
case of highly unlikely events. Arrow et al.(9) provide a discussion of the ways in which cost-benefit analysis might 
be utilized to inform policy decisions. 
 Air travel has enjoyed many advances in safety technology since its inception. Safety enhancement in aviation is 
achieved not only by the evolution of technology, but also by incremental design improvements triggered by 
accidents. There were several epoch-making accidents that facilitated the evolution of the safety system(10)(11), such 
as repeated accidents of the De Havilland Comet in the 1950’s leading to the recognition of metal fatigue. Aviation 
accidents have high public profiles due to a potential for hundreds  of fatalities in a single event. However, past 
research on the economics of aviation safety(12)(13)(14)(15), mainly triggered by the public concerns of airline 
deregulation in 1978 in the U.S., showed that market forces do not provide sufficient incentives for additional safety 
improvement. Thus, one important incentive for safety enhancement for air travel is safety measures mandated by 
laws and government regulations. 
 Private automobiles have also seen a great improvement in safety over recent decades. Safety features such as 
seat belts and air bags have become standard on all new vehicles, and campaigns for and in some cases laws 
requiring the use of seat belts have reduced the morbidity of accidents(16).  The advent of crash testing performed by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA) starting in 1979 has allowed for objective measurement 
of safety and facilitated competition between auto manufacturers on their safety performance(17). A major issue for 
improving highway safety has been related to driver behavior, such as speeding, impaired driving, distracted driving, 
or the use of safety devices such as seat belts(17). There is substantial investment by local governments in enforcing 
laws that promote safe driver behavior. Enforcement of pilot training and responsible behavior is stricter in 
commercial air travel, where a small group of highly trained pilots receive much more oversight by the FAA, 
relative to the standards for private automobile drivers. 
 The outline of the paper is as follows: first, we provide a review of relevant safety related transportation data for 
the time period of 2002-2009. We then provide an overview of the cost of regulations issued for each transport mode 
as estimated by the US Office of Management and Budget. We next review four major safety interventions, two 
commercial aircraft accident investigations and two private automotive recalls, in order to determine their cost 
effectiveness. Finally, we discuss our findings from these studies and how they may impact future transportation 
innovations such as driverless vehicles. 
2. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND REGULATION 
2.1. Safety Statistics 
  In order to examine the emphasis of the US government on transportation safety, we surveyed the accident 
related statistics and economic impact of new safety regulations enacted between 2002 and 2009, the final year in 
which we have comprehensive safety review data for all of the considered transport modes.  
 To understand resource allocation for transportation safety, we must first quantify the level of safety in each 
transport mode. We utilize the conventional metric of fatalities per billion passenger miles1 travelled. Data for 
passenger miles traveled and fatalities for various modes of transportation for years 2002 to 2009 were obtained 
from the 2010 National Transportation Statistics report . We categorized the mode of aviation according to the Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR). CFR Part 121 is the regulation governing scheduled commercial airliners (we call it 
‘commercial air’ in this paper); CFR Part 135 governs on-demand air taxis and scheduled commuter carriers, such as 
business jets and regional airlines (‘commuter and air taxi’); and CFR Part 91 governs general aviation which 
includes private aircraft such as individual owned aircraft or business jets.  
 Additionally, the report contains safety statistics for highway transport, from which we distinguish private 
automobiles (cars, SUVs, light trucks, and motorcycles) and buses. Since the number of passengers involved in 
 
1 Passenger miles represent the total vehicle miles travelled multiplied by the average passenger load for a given 
mode 
private transport is not explicitly known, we rely on survey estimations. The 2009 National Household Travel 
Survey(18) offers estimates of number of passengers and average distance traveled, from which we can determine 
passenger miles and total departures. Similarly, the annual FAA General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey(19)  
provides an estimation of the total number of departures for both general aviation and air taxi operations. However, 
there is no data regarding the average number of passengers on these trips, and therefore we assume ranges of load 
factors to compute passenger miles traveled for these modes.  
 Table I shows the number of fatalities per billion passenger miles by mode of transport. We see that air carrier 
would be judged to be the safest mode, and roughly 250 times safer than private automobiles. General aviation, even 
with our highest estimates for passenger loads, is by far the least safe mode, while commuter and air taxi safety is 
comparable to private automobiles’. Buses rank as the second safest mode, but still are nearly an order of magnitude 
less safe than air carriers. 
Table I. Annual fatalities per billion passenger miles (Year 2002-2009). The number in parentheses is the average 
number of fatalities per year during the period. 
Air 
Carrier 
Commuter 
and Air 
Taxi 
General 
Aviation 
Private 
Auto Bus 
0.038 
(21) 4-11a (42) 
30-160a 
(560) 
9.09 
(41,000) 
0.26 
(45) 
aPassenger loads for commuter and general aviation are estimated at 5-10 and 1-3 passengers, respectively 
2.2. Regulation Review 
 Next, we consider the economic impact of Federal Government regulations that were enacted over the same time 
period. Transport safety regulation system in the United States is complex. A review we have conducted on 
http:www.regulations.gov yielded over 3,500 relevant regulations published from 2000-2009 by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). The reason for including safety 
regulations that pre-date the numbers for transport safety indicators we report above is to include any regulations 
whose effects might be delayed several years. 
 A summary review of the number and cost of regulations reviewed by agency is provided in Error! Reference 
source not found.. While there are too many regulations to list each individually, the highest cost regulations issued 
by each agency are explained in more detail in the following section with more listed in Appendix A. If regulations 
are deemed to involve a significant cost1, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires a cost-benefit 
analysis, and we use this analysis to determine the cost of each regulation to the US economy and transportation 
industry. 
2.3. Notable Regulations Reviewed 
 While NHTSA is responsible for the most significant cost with a total of $73B, the FAA issued the highest 
number of regulations with 3297, 2140 of which were Airworthiness Directives (AD). Only 330 of the 3578 
regulations reviewed were deemed to have a significant cost and therefore reviewed for cost effectiveness by the 
OMB. While regulations not deemed significant may have some non-zero cost, we feel this may be neglected due to 
the low cost of some significant regulations, as low as hundreds of dollars over 10 years. We additionally note that a 
small number of these regulations constitute a majority of the costs, so it is therefore worthwhile to consider some of 
these individually. 
 The single most expensive regulatory action of this time period is NHTSA’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
standards which cost an estimated $47B; as this regulation has a minimal effect on transportation safety, we remove 
this regulation from our analysis and this cost is not included in Error! Reference source not found. or subsequent 
analyses. Other significant regulations include: two regulations for $14B and $10B from NHTSA to improve 
rollover and roof crush risks, $12B from NHTSA for the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 
Documentation Act (discussed in more detail in section 2.2.3), $13B from the FMCSA to update commercial driver 
rest requirements, and FAA regulations of $1.3B, $1.1B, and $1.0B which related to maintenance on late life aircraft, 
aircraft material flammability standards, and catastrophic fuel tank explosions, respectively. Regulations which are 
 
1 A regulatory action is considered “economically significant” under Executive Order 12866 § 3(f)(1) if it is likely to 
result in a rule that may have: "an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health 
or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities." 
not considered significant are often FAA ADs which re-designate airspace, or any agency’s updated testing 
requirements which do not require significant changes to existing practice; we therefore consider potential costs of 
such regulations as negligible. 
2.4. Regulatory Attention by Transport Mode 
 We aggregate the above safety regulations by mode based on the description provided in the regulation 
documentation, calculate the dollars spent on each mode over the entire period, and compare this to the number of 
observed fatalities, as shown in Table III. Note that some regulations may be counted multiple times in this table if 
they are estimated to affect multiple transport modes. It can be seen that air carriers and buses receive much more 
regulatory attention per fatality than other modes. The regulation cost per fatality of air carriers is about 200 times as 
large as that of private automobiles. 
Table III. Total federal regulation cost per fatality in millions for various transport modes (Year 2002-2009). The 
number in parentheses is the total cost in billions during the period. 
Air 
Carrier 
Commuter 
and Air 
Taxi 
General 
Aviation 
Private 
Auto Bus 
$31 
($6.4) 
$11 
($4.8) 
$0.50 
($2.8) 
$0.15
($63) 
$69 
($31) 
 While some of the regulations considered may have direct economic value beyond improving safety, we 
consider that improving safety is the primary benefit of each regulation.  Based on our review of the most cost 
significant regulations as shown in Appendix A, we feel this is a reasonable assumption. We must recognize that a 
regulation would be deemed cost effective by the number of fatalities prevented, which we have no way of 
estimating.  Instead, we consider the regulation cost per fatality observed, which gives us an idea of the total 
fatalities that could have been prevented, assuming that the number of fatalities would not have increased 
significantly absent the regulations. For comparison, we may consider the DOT specified value of statistical life 
(VSL), which is currently set at $9.1 million per fatality prevented. 
 Using this cost per observed fatality as a metric, we find that the cost of regulations for public modes of 
transportation, air carriers and buses, is much higher than their private counterparts, general aviation and private 
automobiles.  As the rate of regulatory spending per fatality in these two modes is higher than the VSL, it may be 
argued that regulators are responding to a higher public demand for transportation safety in these modes. Commuter 
and air taxis receive moderate regulatory attention as compared to commercial aviation and general aviation, while 
general aviation and private automobiles, the two least safe modes, received the least regulatory spending per 
fatality by the US federal government. 
3. COST EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF SPECIFIC FATAL ACCIDENT RESPONSES  
 The cost of regulations cited in the previous section is based on government estimates justifying the regulations. 
It is instructive to also look at the actual costs incurred to correct some well publicized safety defects. Such an 
Table II. Breakdown of reviewed federal-government regulations by cost and agency 
FAA FMCSA NHTSA DOT Total 
Number of Regulations 3297 34 187 60 3578 
Number of Regulations 
with Significant Costb 282 13 31 4 330 
Total Significant 
Regulation Cost $7.5B $18B $73B $375M $99B 
Cost of Top 3 
Regulations 
$1.3B, $1.1B, 
$1.0B 
$13B, $0.48B, 
$0.38B 
$14B, $12B, 
$10B 
$280M, $89M, 
$5M 
$14B, $13B, 
$12B 
bBased on regulations with cost estimates reviewed by US OMB 
examination reveals that there are additional costs, including the cost of investigations to determine what safety 
defect caused fatalities, and the cost to recall vehicles. In this section, we propose a method of calculating the cost 
effectiveness of these investigations and demonstrate its application on example case studies from transportation and 
aviation. These few cases are not intended as representative of the current state of transportation policy and are 
simply provided as examples of how the proposed cost effectiveness calculation might be applied. 
3.1. Cost Effectiveness Measures of Safety Investigations and the Resulting Remedies 
 Accident investigations have been playing a central role in improving aviation safety. Elaborate investigations 
identify the probable causes of accidents and lead to safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents from 
occurring in the future. Independence of investigators from other authorities and separation from blame guarantee 
the quality of investigations(20)(21). More recently, it has been proposed that the approaches and methods of aviation 
accident investigation be extended to wider context of social concerns, such as natural disaster, or economic 
fraud(22)(23). Aviation is also a mode of civil transportation for which accident investigation is mandated in the U.S, 
and the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) is responsible for it. 
 Similarly, the NTSB carries out accident investigations for private automobiles, though due to the sheer number 
of accidents, not all will receive NTSB attention.  When a safety issue is found requiring attention, typically after 
one or more accidents take place, the Department of Transportation may mandate a recall of a certain vehicle or 
family of vehicles. As with aviation accidents, a series of accident and safety investigations may be undertaken; 
however unlike some aviation cases this is a relatively negligible cost for automobile recalls. It then falls to the 
responsibility of the manufacturer to provide an appropriate safety remedy for the affected vehicles and to cover the 
costs of this repair.  Though automotive recalls and aircraft accident investigations are not identical, we view the 
results of both actions in terms of reacting to a safety issue with new measures as similar enough for comparison. 
 For a cost effectiveness study, we deploy a simple break-even calculation of the investment in an accident 
investigation or recall and focus on fatal accidents. The expense, C୧୬୴ , is the cost of the investigation and the following safety remedies, if needed. The payoff is the expected monetary value of lives to be saved, Vୱୟ୴ୣୢ, in the future as a result of the investigation and remedies. Potential future fatalities related to an accident are calculated by 
the product of the expected number of fatalities N୤ that would result from a similar accident, the number of airplanes or automobiles Nୟ that have the same failure potential, and the probability of reoccurrence of the accident in the remaining lifetime. For estimating Nୟ, one may take into account not only existing vehicles but also not-yet-built ones that will potentially benefit in the future from the improved design and safety regulations. Accident 
investigation has the potential to change the probability of accident reoccurrence, through implementation of the 
recommended safety measures. On this basis, the expected monetary value of lives to be saved (Vୱୟ୴ୣୢ) can be calculated as 
Vsaved ൌ V1lifeNf NaሺPbefore െ Pafterሻ (1) 
where Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ is the value of a single life, Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ is the probability of a fatal accident occurring per remaining lifetime of one vehicle before safety improvement is applied, and Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰  is the probability of an accident after the improvement is applied. The break-even point happens when the invested cost in the investigation and remedies, 
C୧୬୴, is equal to Vୱୟ୴ୣୢ.  The dollar value of a fatality, Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ, is defined as the amount we are willing to give up in exchange for a small decrease in the probability of one less fatality, called the value of a statistical life(24). This is a common approach in 
economics, used to evaluate effectiveness of policies in medicine, environment and other areas. How much a society 
should invest in preventing fatalities is controversial, as seen in many ongoing discussions in different communities, 
e.g., health care, transportation, environment, etc. Viscusi(25) analyzed data on worker deaths across different 
industries, and suggested that the value of a life lies in the range of $4.7 to $8.7 million. In aviation, economic 
values used in investment and regulatory decisions of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) were analyzed 
and determined. The guidance led to the value of $6.2 million per fatality adopted in 2011(26) and most recently 
updated it to $9.1 million in 2013(3). Similarly in Europe, an aviation fatality avoided is valued at € 4.05 million by 
the European Transport Safety Council in 2003(27).  
 For a given investigation and remedy cost C୧୬୴, it is possible to calculate how much we spend to prevent the loss of one life in the future as  
Cଵ୪୧୤ୣ ൌ C୧୬୴N୤ NୟሺPୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ െ Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰ሻ (2) 
 This measure would be compared to the DOT guideline to determine whether accident investigation is cost 
effective or not. On the other hand, the value of lives to be saved can be used as the cost effective threshold of the 
invested cost C୧୬୴,୲୦  or the accident probability Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦  assuming that Pୟ୤୲ୣ୰  is zero as in Eqs. (3) and (4) 
respectively. 
C୧୬୴,୲୦ ൌ Vଵ୪୧୤ୣN୤ NୟPୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ (3) 
Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ ൌ C୧୬୴V1lifeNf Na (4) 
Note that these equations are not intended to provide a precise estimate of cost effectiveness of investigations as 
many of the terms in these equations are not known and can never be measured. However, we may be able to 
estimate these terms in order to produce a Fermi estimate of the probability of an accident before an intervention as 
well as the break-even probability which would justify the cost of the reaction. When these numbers are comparable, 
we are unable to say whether an intervention was truly effective; instead we use this analysis as a way to discuss 
differences in cost effectiveness between various reactions to accidents. 
3.2. Case Studies for Investigations into Fatal Accidents 
We select four cases of responses to fatal accidents from roughly the same time period as our study of 
transportation regulations. These four cases should not be regarded as a complete list of all actions taken to respond 
to transportation safety risks during this time period. They are selected as, in the opinion of the authors, they 
represent the most noteworthy safety investigations during this period for commercial airlines and private 
automobiles, respectively. Because of their high profile, we are also able to obtain much of the data needed for our 
analysis. By studying specific cases of reactions to safety issues, we hope to better understand the situations in 
which a proposed remedy is likely to be cost effective. This is not intended to represent the broad state of 
transportation safety or policy; these case studies simply are used to demonstrate the application of the cost 
effectiveness calculation introduced in the previous section. Recognizing that the analysis performed is speculative 
due to limited available information, we take conservative assumptions regarding costs and probabilities of accidents 
recurring in order to consider any potential cases as much possible. 
3.2.1.  American Airlines Flight 587 
 The first example is the fatal accident of American Airlines Flight 587, which occurred on November 12, 2001. 
The airplane, an Airbus A300-605R, crashed into a neighborhood in Belle Harbor, New York, after taking off from 
the John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 260 people aboard and five people on the ground were killed(28)(29).  
 NTSB determined that the probable cause was “the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the 
loads beyond ultimate strength that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs 
(when the pilot reacted to wake turbulence).” The NTSB report concluded that “The American Airlines Advanced 
Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have 
an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence.” The report also discussed a widespread 
misunderstanding among pilots about performance of the rudder limiter system; pilots believed that a limiter would 
prevent structural damage no matter how they moved the control. However, the limiter did not take into account 
structural damage caused by repetitive opposite direction rudder inputs which resulted in the excessive load. 
 FAA issued an airworthiness directive (AD) in 2011(30) requiring the modification to the rudder control system, 
called the pedal travel limiter unit (PTLU). The AD estimates the implementation cost of PTLU for 215 airplanes in 
the fleet at $42,677,500. For the cost effectiveness study, the number of potential fatalities was estimated at 213, 
based on the typical passenger capacity of the model (266 passengers) and a load factor of about 80% , and nine 
crewmembers. Adding the costs of accident investigation and other safety remedies (e.g., pilot training), which are 
not publicly available, the total invested cost is roughly estimated as $52 million US 2013 dollars. 
 Using above data, we calculate the cost effectiveness threshold of the accident probability Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ defined in 
Eq. (4). Based on $9.1 million for Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ, Pୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ,୲୦ is estimated at 1.2x10-4 in the remaining lifetime of a single 
airplane. This probability corresponds to 6.0x10-9 per flight assuming that the remaining life time is roughly half the 
design service goal of 40,000 flight cycles for the airplane(31). This rough estimate is based on analysis of the 
available operating data of A300 class aircraft in the TranStats database(32). It is remarkable that this probability is 
substantially smaller than the actual total rate of fatal accidents per departure from 2002-2009, 1.8x10-7 . Therefore, 
it can be said that this accident investigation is cost effective unless the probability of the accident is extremely small. 
3.2.2. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 
 The next example is the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261, which occurred on January 31, 2000. Fatalities 
included two pilots, three cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers. The airplane, MD-83, was destroyed by impact 
forces(33). The NTSB concluded that the probable cause was “a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-
flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly’s acme nut threads. The thread failure was 
caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines’ insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly.” 
 According to the NTSB report, several factors contributed to the accident. First, lubrication of the nut threads 
was not adequately performed. Second, there were inappropriately wide lubrication and inspection intervals for the 
wear condition; because of this, wear exceeding its critical condition could not be discovered before the following 
lubrication or inspection point. The FAA issued airworthiness directives (ADs)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38)(39) requiring repetitive 
inspections and lubrication. These improvements were applicable not only to MD series but also to Boeing airplanes. 
Table IV shows the fleet sizes of airplane models, to which the ADs were applied, and the passenger sizes of those 
airplanes obtained from the company’s website. We roughly assume that five inspections and lubrications would be 
needed in the rest of the lifecycle of each airplane, and the overhaul of nut and screw, which was applied only to 
Boeing-737, is a one-time item. Based on the work hours and labor rates provided by the ADs, as well as the 
estimated cost of inspection, we calculate the total cost for the safety improvements as roughly $18.5 million US 
2013 dollars. 
Table IV. Parameters estimated for Alaska Airlines case 
 Fleet size* Passenger size (model) 
MD-80 1218 155 (MD-83) 
Boeing-767 411 218 (767-300ER) 
Boeing-737 1641 162 (737-800) 
Boeing-747 236 416 (747-400) 
Boeing-757 730 280 (757-300) 
Boeing-777 203 365 (777-300ER) 
* Fleet size registered in the US 
 In the same manner as the previous example, we calculate the cost effective threshold of the accident probability 
as 2.5×10-6 per lifetime of single airplane. Here, we used $9.1 million for Vଵ୪୧୤ୣ, and the number of potential fatalities to be saved is calculated by summing up N୤	Nୟ of each airplane model shown in Table IV with a load factor of 80%. This probability can be converted into 1.2×10-10 per flight, which is also much lower than the actual fatal accident 
rate (1.8x10-7). As with the previous example, we assume based on analysis of the TranStats database for Boeing 
aircraft that the remaining life of the airplane is 20,000, half the design service goal of a typical airplane. 
 Despite being the two most fatal aviation accidents in the US over the time period we cover in this study, their 
total safety regulation cost (about $67 million) only represents about 1 percent of the total regulation cost of $7.5B 
as described in Error! Reference source not found.. 
3.2.3. Ford/Firestone Tread Separation and Rollover Recall, 2000 
 The first automotive recall considered is the Ford/Firestone tire recall in 2000.  NHTSA found that Firestone 
Wilderness AT and ATX tires produced at the Firestone plant in Decatur, IL were subject to tread separation during 
operation in certain conditions, particularly low pressure, high speed, hot weather operations, which could lead to 
increased risk of vehicle rollover when the tires fail.  In particular, these tires were installed on Ford sport utility 
vehicles, where it was thought this issue would lead to a higher risk of roll over(40). Firestone issued a recall of a total 
of 6.5 million tires, affecting roughly 1.3 million vehicles(41).  Though estimates vary, somewhere between 150 and 
300 fatalities are thought to have been caused by this tread separation issue(42).  The total direct cost of this recall, 
shared between Firestone and Ford, is estimated at between approximately $1.3-1.7B in 2013 dollars(43); the cost of 
investigation is assumed to be negligible as NHTSA’s entire annual highway safety program budget is roughly 
$120M. 
 Using $9.1M as the value of statistical life, and considering an average passenger load for private automobiles as 
1.5 based on the 2009 National Household Travel Survey(18), we calculate a threshold probability of a fatal accident 
per vehicle between 7.4×10-5 and 9.7×10-5.  In the case of automobile accidents, we can also estimate the actual 
probability of failure before the recall since we have over one million vehicles and hundreds of accidents.  Based on 
the 1.3M vehicles affected and NHTSA’s most likely estimate of tread separation related fatalities of 197(41), we find 
the probability of a fatal accident as 1.5×10-4, with 5% and 95% confidence bounds of 1.3×10-4 and 1.7×10-4.  We 
may additionally correct this probability to account for the fact that the 6.5M tires recalled were not all at end of life, 
and some may have failed later had they not been recalled. However, since this would depend on individual 
operating conditions, driving habits, tire age, and probability of tire failure over tire life, it is difficult to make any 
meaningful assessment, though we conservatively estimate a range from a factor of 1.5 to 3 increase in fatal accident 
probability based on the average age of vehicles included in the recall meaning the average wear on recalled tires 
between one third and two thirds of the expected tire life of roughly 5 years or 60,000 miles. 
 We find that the estimated range of probability of a fatal accident is only slightly higher than the range of 
threshold probability of failure based on the data collected. This indicates that the safety increase due to the recall 
likely at least broke even with the costs, and could be as much as a factor of 3 more.  However, we note that this is a 
much narrower margin that seen with the previous two cases of accident investigations in air travel. 
 It should be noted that this investigation led to one of the most cost significant regulations for private 
automobiles during the time of our survey.  This is the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 
Documentation (TREAD) Act, which cost a total of $24B, 38% of all private automotive regulation costs during our 
survey period from 2002-2009.  However, this regulation deals exclusively with the way manufacturers report 
recalls and safety concerns to NHTSA, and does not specifically address the issue of tread separation or rollover and 
therefore this cost is not included in our calculations for this investigation. 
3.2.4. Toyota Unintended Acceleration Recalls, 2009/2010 
 The second auto case considered is actually two related recalls which occurred at roughly the same time which 
dealt with the unintended acceleration accidents involving Toyota vehicles in 2009 and 2010.  The first recall 
replaced floor mats in some Toyota vehicles which were believed to potentially cause the accelerator pedal to stick.  
The second dealt with wear in the accelerator pedal that could cause sticking unrelated to the floor mats.  These 
recalls affected 2.23M and 4.44M vehicles, respectively.  Due to overlap in the recalls, a total of nearly 5M vehicles 
were recalled. Toyota vehicles with fatal accidents attributed to unintended acceleration account for as many as 48 
deaths(44), though DOT investigations concluded that many such accidents may actually be related to driver error(45).  
The direct cost of the recalls, as reported by Toyota, was $1.12B(46) and the cost of the investigation is again 
assumed to be negligible in comparison. 
 Again using the value of statistical life of $9.1M and an average passenger load of 1.5, we find that the threshold 
probability of a fatal accident per vehicle for cost effectiveness is 1.65×10-5.  We again estimate the actual 
probability of failure based on the number of fatal accidents observed, and find a nominal value of 4.96×10-6 with 
confidence bounds of 3.00×10-6 and 6.91×10-6.  As with our previous auto recall example, we recognize that these 
estimates are based on some vehicles which are not at end of life.  However, in this case we consider that it may be 
reasonable to assume that the probability of this specific accident is constant over the lifetime of the vehicle, and we 
may try to estimate the average age of vehicles in the recall.  Based on available data, we consider that the average 
vehicle recalled was 5 years old, with a useful life of 15 years.  Since we assume the probability of an accident is 
constant over time, we may simply correct our calculated probability of failure by a factor of 3, such that we find the 
estimated probability before the recall as 1.49×10-5 with confidence bounds of 9.00×10-6 to 2.07×10-5.  Even with 
this correction, we see that it is very likely that the probability of a fatal accident prior to the recall was below the 
cost effectiveness threshold. 
 Since this recall happened outside the date range of our regulation study, we have no direct information about 
any regulations resulting from this recall and investigation.  However, the authors are unaware of any current or 
proposed regulations related to these Toyota recalls. 
4. DISCUSSION OF COST EFFECTIVENESS 
 Based on the studies presented in sections 2 and 3, we may draw some conclusions about the cost effectiveness 
of safety measures for various modes and the allocation of resources within the US transportation sector.  We may 
also attempt to understand some broader implications for safety measures based on differences between different 
transport modes. However, we recognize that this discussion does not represent a complete list of factors influencing 
allocation of resources for transportation safety and that our review of accident investigations is limited to a small 
sample size due to lack of available information. The discussion in this section is not intended to propose optimal 
policy, but simply to summarize potential effects evident in what data we do have. 
 First, we find that commercial aviation receives much more regulatory attention per fatality than general aviation. 
At the levels of regulatory spending seen during the years considered (2002-2009), commercial aviation received 
regulatory spending per fatality at a rate of roughly three times the DOT VSL.  At the same time, general aviation 
received the second lowest regulatory attention per fatality despite being the least safe mode in our study based on 
fatalities per passenger mile. General aviation additionally received the lowest regulatory emphasis in terms of 
absolute dollars spent over the time period considered at $2.82 billion as compared to $6.43 billion for commercial 
aviation. A recent study of general aviation safety by Thomas Frank at USA Today(47) found that 86% of general 
aviation accidents are attributed to pilot error, including cases where subsequent investigations reveal defective parts 
contributed to an accident. These findings suggest that public demand for safety is lower when an individual is 
perceived to be responsible for their own safety, even though this may not always truly be the case. 
 We consider several reasons why this disparity between modes might exist.  First, while fatal commercial airline 
accidents may be catastrophic events involving hundreds of fatalities, general aviation accidents typically affect few 
people and occur more frequently and with less national coverage.  Additionally, a different level of individual 
responsibility exists in general aviation accidents, where those involved are at least perceived to have some control 
over ensuring their own safety.  This personal responsibility does not exist in commercial air travel, where travelers 
must place their trust in the pilot to ensure their safety. These factors together may lead to a higher perceived risk 
from commercial air travel by the general public, which is then reflected in their demand for new regulations. Even 
if risks are well understood, individuals may feel that a higher level of safety is appropriate in modes where a third 
party is providing transportation. This concept of risk perception is one that is already well studied in existing 
literature. As the details of risk perception lie outside the authors’ expertise, we elect not to discuss them here and 
instead refer readers to important works such as Slovic(48), Rowe and Wright(49), and Sjöberg(50). 
 This idea is reinforced by the allocation of new regulations in private automobiles and bus travel, where buses 
receive much more regulatory attention, possibly due to the fact that, as with the aviation case, bus accidents involve 
a larger number of people who are dependent on a single driver to ensure safety. Finally, in the case of private 
automobile, much of the regulation and enforcement of responsible driver behavior is executed by state and local 
government. In that realm we see new regulations such as requiring seat-belt use and prohibitions on using cell 
phones. However, the increased regulatory cost of such measures is not expected to be able to offset greatly the 
factor of 450 between regulatory spending per fatality between buses and private automobiles. 
 These findings may have implications for future developments in transportation such as partially or fully 
automated transport systems. Many automobile companies and research groups have made substantial efforts to 
develop autonomous or self-driving cars. As of 2015, four states (California, Nevada, Florida, and Michigan as well 
as the District of Columbia) have legalized the use of autonomous vehicles on public roads. A 2014 University of 
Michigan study of public perception of autonomous cars(51) found that 88% if survey respondents expressed concern 
about the prospect of riding in a fully autonomous vehicle, while over 60% also responding that the use of fully 
autonomous vehicles would be expected to reduce both the number and severity of accidents. These results reflect 
our suggestion that entrusting one’s safety to an external actor increases an individual’s demand for safety. 
Designers of autonomous systems as well as policy makers should therefore consider the public’s increased demand 
for safety in these new modes as they develop. 
 We also proposed a method for approximating the cost effectiveness of reactive safety measures like accident 
investigations and recalls, and reviewed two of the largest airline accident investigations and two of the largest 
automobile recalls from roughly the same time period as our regulation study.  While both airline accident 
investigations were found to be easily cost effective by at least an order of magnitude based on the expected number 
of fatalities prevented, the automotive recalls were not so clear, with one being slightly cost effective and one likely 
below the cost effectiveness threshold.  This implies that these more reactive safety measures may be more likely to 
be cost effective for aviation compared to automobiles, though further investigation into a more comprehensive list 
of investigations is needed. 
 We propose that this observed difference might be due to two factors: the population size of the vehicles affected, 
and the relative reliability of both systems.  Though safety investigations for private automobiles are relatively 
inexpensive, the cost of performing a recall is often quite high even when the cost of a remedy is low due to the 
potentially millions of vehicles involved.  Conversely, commercial aviation accident investigations may be much 
more costly, but the resulting safety recommendations are only implemented on several hundred aircraft or less.  
Compounding this issue is the relative value at risk in terms of the number of people affected per accident, which is 
much greater for air travel than for automobiles.  This means that fixing any one issue for an airline will result in a 
proportionally larger increase in safety than for automobiles where a safety increase may be only marginal. 
 This reveals potentially important considerations for designers as well as regulators, as the types of safety issues 
faced in all transport modes typically have very low probabilities of occurrence, on the order of one in one million or 
less. This means that uncovering and preventing safety issues during the design process requires extensive testing 
and simulation, which is costly, and these costs are ultimately passed on to consumers. These costs are only 
exacerbated when the method of failure is unknown or difficult to predict, such as those related to operator error. We 
see that for airliners, safety concerns are easier to detect due to the rarity of accidents and in-depth investigation into 
each accident, while with private automobiles individual issues may be more difficult to find and are clearly more 
expensive to remedy due to the cost of recalls.  
 Furthermore, the financial incentives in commercial aviation and private automobiles are quite different. Airlines 
and aircraft designers may seek to improve safety beyond what is required in order to appear safe to their customers. 
The relative low cost of addressing safety concerns in commercial aviation does not provide adequate financial 
incentive for designers to attempt to avoid them, and public opinion after accidents generally affects airlines with 
little impact on designers(12) (13) (14) (15). Conversely, we have shown that automobile recalls pose a financial burden 
applied directly to automobile designers. Automobile designers face additional losses related to public perception of 
their brand as they compete on safety records(52). This may suggest that the automobile market is more efficient at 
creating improved safety, while commercial aviation safety requires more regulatory involvement. This might help 
to justify the differences in regulatory attention between modes. Understanding these differences between each 
mode may assist in an effective balance between preventative design and testing versus oversight and improvements 
to existing products. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 We have shown that despite their better safety records, airlines and buses receive much more regulatory 
emphasis as measured by dollars per observed fatality as compared to general aviation and private automobiles, 
respectively.  This could be due in part to non-regulatory safety actions in modes like private automobiles such as 
traffic enforcement and seat belt requirements, as well as avoidance of the higher cost of safety remedies in these 
modes as seen in our review of recalls. We also conducted an initial study of two major commercial aviation 
accident investigations and two major automobile safety recalls and demonstrated a cost effectiveness calculation 
approach for each, finding that the two aircraft accident investigations strongly appeared to be cost effective, while 
the effectiveness of the two automobile recalls was less clear.  Based on analysis of our regulation studies, we 
suggest public demand for increased safety appears to be affected in part by the level of personal responsibility for 
ensuring safety. Additionally, the effectiveness of various types of safety measures (regulation or 
investigation/recall) is shown to be affected by the relative number of affected vehicles, the number of lives at risk, 
and the relative safety level of the mode. Designers and policy makers should be aware of these effects as they work 
on improving existing transportation as well as the development of novel modes, and methods for cost benefit 
analysis such as the one presented in this work can be utilized to estimate the cost effectiveness of proposed reactive 
measures. New forms of transportation such as self-driving cars may not only need to be safer than traditional cars, 
but may have even more stringent safety requirements. 
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APPENDIX A: SIGNIFICANT REGULATIONS BY ISSUING AGENCY 
Table V. Significant FAA Regulations 
Document ID  Summary  Mode Affected1 
Effective 
Date 
 Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years  
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FAA‐1999‐
5401‐0145 
Amends inspection and records keeping for aircraft of 
greater than 14 years of use.   C,A  3/4/2005   $   1,350,000,000   18% 
FAA‐2000‐
7909‐0043 
The FAA is adopting upgraded flammability standards for 
thermal and acoustic insulation materials used in 
transport category airplanes. 
C,A,G  8/2/2003   $   1,084,000,000   14% 
FAA‐2005‐
22997‐0154 
Amends FAA regulations that require operators and 
manufacturers of transport category airplanes to take 
steps that, in combination with other required actions, 
should greatly reduce the chances of a catastrophic fuel 
tank explosion. 
C  9/19/2009   $   1,012,000,000   13% 
FAA‐2002‐
12261‐009 
This final rule permits the initiation of Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minimum (RVSM) flights in the airspace over 
the contiguous 48 States of the United States, the District 
of Columbia, Alaska, that portion of the Gulf of Mexico 
where the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides 
air traffic services, the San Juan Flight Information Region 
(FIR), and the airspace between Florida and the San Juan 
FIR. 
C,A,G  10/27/2003   $      579,466,667   8% 
FAA‐2007‐
28058‐0008 
Adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for various IAE 
turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain No. 
4 bearing oil system components from service at the next 
shop visit or by an end date determined by the engine 
model. 
C  8/20/2008   $      450,371,650   6% 
FAA‐2000‐
8490‐0010 
This final rule amends the list of airspace locations where 
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) may be 
applied to include the New York Flight Information 
Region (FIR) portion of West Atlantic Route System 
(WATRS) airspace. 
G  12/10/2001   $      262,000,000   3% 
FAA‐2005‐
20836‐0046 
Adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 
Boeing transport category airplanes related to the 
flammability of installed insulation blankets 
A  12/15/2008   $      177,700,000   2% 
FAA‐2004‐
18379 
Fuel tank safety requirements related to electrical wiring, 
including updated inspection requirements for wiring 
systems. 
C  12/10/2007   $      166,400,000   2% 
FAA‐2001‐
11133‐2709 
The FAA is creating a new rule for the manufacture, 
certification, operation, and maintenance of light‐sport 
aircraft. Represents an overall update to manufacture of 
aircraft and certification of pilots. 
G  9/1/2004   $      158,400,000   2% 
FAA‐2005‐
20245‐0075 
Amends cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and digital flight 
data recorder (DFDR) regulations affecting certain air 
carriers, operators, and aircraft manufacturers in order to 
improve the availability of CVR and DFDR information. 
C,A  4/7/2008   $      153,636,364   2% 
FAA‐2001‐
11032‐0007 
This amendment implements two security design 
requirements governing transport category airplanes 
related to the security of commercial aircraft cockpit 
doors to unauthorized intrusion. 
C  1/15/2002   $      131,000,000   2% 
FAA‐2003‐
15085‐0075 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is amending its 
hazardous materials (hazmat) training requirements for 
certain air carriers and commercial operators. 
C,A  11/7/2005   $      107,500,000   1% 
FAA‐2005‐
23500 
Airworthiness Directive for International Aero Engines 
V2500 Turbofan Engines  C  11/15/2007   $        99,338,400   1% 
FAA‐2000‐
7018‐0120 
The interim final rule established fees for FAA air traffic 
and related services for certain aircraft that transit U.S.‐
controlled airspace but neither take off from, nor land in, 
the United States. 
C  8/20/2001   $        97,000,000   1% 
FAA‐2001‐
8724‐0002 
This final rule amends the existing airport security rules. 
It revises certain applicability provisions, definitions, and 
terms; reorganizes these rules into subparts containing 
related requirements; and incorporates some 
requirements already implemented in security programs. 
C,A  11/14/2001   $        92,200,000   1% 
FAA‐2007‐
0411‐0001 
Revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that 
applies to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. That AD 
currently requires that the FAA‐approved maintenance 
inspection program be revised to include inspections that 
will give no less than the required damage tolerance 
rating for each structural significant item, and repair of 
cracked structure. 
C  1/22/2008   $        90,090,000   1% 
FAA‐2002‐
12504‐0001 
This final rule requires improved flightdeck security and 
operational and procedures changes to prevent 
unauthorized access to the flightdeck on passenger‐
carrying aircraft and some cargo aircraft operated by 
foreign carriers under the provisions of part 129. 
C,A  6/21/2002   $        83,200,000   1% 
FAA‐2004‐
18775 
Brings US European Airworthiness standards closer in 
regards to flight guidance systems  C,A  5/11/2006   $        69,636,364   1% 
FAA‐2007‐
0412‐0001 
Revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that 
applies to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes related to 
corrosion and cracking certification. 
C  1/22/2008   $        62,304,000   1% 
FAA‐2006‐
26722‐0039 
Adopts several standards of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and requires manufacturers 
to incorporate certain security features in the design of 
new transport category airplanes related to unauthorized 
access to the cockpit of commercial category aircraft. 
C  11/28/2008   $        60,500,000   1% 
FAA‐2001‐
10910‐0484 
The FAA is revising the applicability of certain collision 
avoidance system requirements for airplanes.  C  5/1/2003   $        59,000,000   1% 
FAA‐2004‐
18019‐0006 
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) 
for Honeywell International Inc. related to stage 1 disk 
inspection and service 
A  4/18/2005   $        58,151,000   1% 
FAA‐2004‐
18038 
Airworthiness directive for Honeywell T53 turboshaft 
engines life limit reduction for certain engine 
components 
G  2/16/2006   $        58,000,000   1% 
FAA‐2001‐
10047‐0232 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is updating 
and revising the regulations governing operations of 
aircraft in fractional ownership programs. 
G  11/17/2003   $        57,200,000   1% 
FAA‐2008‐
0517‐0065 
Establishes procedures to address congestion in the New 
York City area by assigning slots at John F. Kennedy (JFK) 
and Newark Liberty (Newark) International Airports in a 
way that allows carriers to respond to market forces to 
drive efficient airline behavior. 
C,A  12/9/2008   $        54,000,000   1% 
FAA‐2007‐
28283‐0013 
Adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 
Boeing Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800 and –900 
series airplanes. This AD requires a one‐time general 
visual inspection of frames between body station (BS) 
360 and BS 907 to determine if certain support brackets 
of the air conditioning (A/C) outlet extrusions are 
installed; medium‐ and high‐frequency eddy current 
inspections for cracking of the frames around the 
attachment holes of the subject brackets; and repair if 
necessary. 
C  2/27/2009   $        46,216,954   1% 
FAA‐2001‐
8725‐0003 
This final rule amends the existing airplane operator 
security rule to include security requirement for 
additional types of operators related to terrorism and 
hazardous material threats. 
C,A  11/14/2001   $        40,000,000   1% 
FAA‐2001‐
10428‐0020 
This action amends the flight data recorder regulations by 
expanding the recording specifications of certain data 
parameters for specified airplanes, and by adding aircraft 
models to the lists of aircraft excepted from the 1997 
regulations. 
C  7/18/2003   $        38,000,000   1% 
All Other 
Regulations            $      856,399,342   11% 
Total            $   7,553,710,740     
1Affected modes are defined as: C = Commercial, A = Air Taxi, G = General  
Table VI. Significant NHTSA Regulations 
Document ID  Description  Mode Affected 
Effective 
Date 
Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years 
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
NHTSA‐2009‐
0093‐0001 
As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the risk of 
rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury 
in those crashes, this final rule upgrades the agency's 
safety standard on roof crush resistance in several ways. 
P  7/13/2009   $  14,883,700,000   25% 
NHTSA‐2005‐
20586‐0001  
This final rule establishes a new Federal motor vehicle 
safety standard (FMVSS) requiring installation of a tire 
pressure monitoring system (TPMS) capable of detecting 
when one or more of a vehicle's tires is significantly 
under‐inflated. 
P,T,B  4/8/2005   $  13,899,600,000   23% 
NHTSA‐2007‐
27662‐0001‐
0001  
As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the serious 
risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious 
injury in those crashes, this document establishes a new 
Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) No. 126 
to require electronic stability control (ESC) systems on 
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, 
and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 Kg 
(10,000 pounds) or less. 
P,T,B  6/5/2007   $  10,835,000,000   18% 
NHTSA‐2000‐
8572‐0219‐
0001  
In response to a mandate in the Transportation Recall 
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation 
(TREAD) Act of 2000, this agency is issuing a two‐part 
final rule. The first part is contained in this document. It 
establishes a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
that requires the installation of tire pressure monitoring 
systems (TPMSs) that warn the driver when a tire is 
significantly under‐inflated. The standard applies to 
passenger cars, trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles, 
and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 
pounds or less, except those vehicles with dual wheels on 
an axle 
P,T,B  8/5/2002   $     8,966,200,000  15% 
NHTSA‐2007‐
29134‐0005 
This final rule incorporates a dynamic pole test into 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 214, 
Side impact protection.' To meet the test, vehicle 
manufacturers will need to assure head and improved 
chest protection in side crashes. 
P  11/13/2007   $     6,160,000,000  10% 
NHTSA‐2005‐
23439‐0001  
In 6/2003, NHTSA published a final rule establishing 
upgraded tire performance requirements for new tires 
for use on vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 
10,000 pounds or less. We are amending the 
performance requirements for snow tires used on light 
vehicles. 
P  6/1/2007   $     1,199,000,000  2% 
NHTSA‐2004‐
19807‐0002 
This final rule upgrades NHTSA's head restraint standard 
in order to reduce whiplash injuries in rear collisions. For 
front seats, the rule establishes a higher minimum height 
requirement, a requirement limiting the distance 
between the back of an occupant's head and the 
occupant's head restraint, as well as a limit on the size of 
gaps and openings within head restraints. 
P  3/14/2005   $        985,140,000   2% 
All Other 
Regulations            $     3,160,905,325  5% 
Total            $  60,089,545,325     
2Affected modes are defined as: P = Private Auto, T = Commercial Truck, B = Bus  
Table VII. Significant FMCSA Regulations 
Document ID  Description  Mode Affected3 
Effective 
Date 
Estimated Cost 
Over 10 Years 
Percentage 
of Total 
Agency 
Cost 
FMCSA‐1997‐
2350‐23305 
Increased requirements for commercial vehicle driver 
rest and drive time limits  T  6/27/2003   $ 16,250,000,000   89% 
FMCSA‐2001‐
11061‐0055 
Improves requirements for safety audit of new 
commercial vehicle carriers  T,B  2/17/2009   $     510,390,000   3% 
FMCSA‐2001‐
9709‐0786 
Updated requirements and penalties for commercial 
driver license holders related to non‐commercial vehicle 
offences or convictions 
T,B  1/29/2003   $     466,250,000   3% 
FMCSA‐2000‐
7017‐0028 
Subjects commercial passenger transport (9‐15 
passengers) to same safety requirements as 
motorcoaches 
B  9/11/2003   $     213,000,000   1% 
FMCSA‐1997‐
2210‐0209 
Updates medical certification requirements for obtaining 
a commercial drivers license  T,B  1/30/2009   $     199,020,000   1% 
FMCSA‐1997‐
2199‐0218 
Updates training requirements for obtaining a 
commercial drivers license  T,B  7/20/2004   $     146,410,000   1% 
FMCSA‐1997‐
2277‐0093 
Updated rules and requirements for obtaining prior 
safety records of prospective commercial drivers license 
holders 
T,B  4/29/2004   $     136,730,000   1% 
FMCSA‐2002‐
13015‐0023 
Allows for better enforcement of existing rules to 
prevent motor carriers from operating outside their 
prescribed authority 
T,B  9/27/2006   $     108,300,000   1% 
All Other 
Regulations            $     206,738,750   1% 
Total            $ 18,236,838,750     
3Affected modes are defined as: T = Commercial Truck, B = Bus 
